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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HARVEY BURTON
HATHA vV AY,

Plaintif!-Appellant.
-vsJOHN W. TURNER, \VARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case No.
12858

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Harvey Burton Hathaway, appeals
from a decision in the Third Judicial District Court
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On November 26, 1971, Harvey Burton Hathaway
filed a petition for a writ of habeas eorpt•s in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that
his confinement by Respondent was invalid and illegal.
The matter came on for hearing on February 24, 1972,
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before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, who
denied the writ on February 24, 1972.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Harvey Burton Hatha,vay, seeks
a reversal of the decision and judgment below with directions that he he released from the custody of Respondent and be allowed to withdraw his previous plea
of guilty.
STATEMENT OF -FACTS
On May 10, 1965, an information charging Han'ey
Burton Hathaway with murder in the first degree was
filed in the Sixth Judicial District Court. (Exhibit 2)
The information was amended on August 31, 1965, to
allege the crime of murder in the second degree. (Exhibit 2) On August 31, 1965, Harvey Burton
way pleaded guilty to the crime of murder in the second
degree. (Exhibit 2) l\fr. Hathaway testified that he
thought he was pleading guilty to a manslaughter
charge. ( R. 40) Appellant testified that he did not see
his original commitment order until a week or so after
he was committed to Respondent's custody, and that he
thought it said "second degree murder, one to ten."
(R. 41) Appellant stated that he still was not sure what
his sentence was (R. 43) hut he was under the impression that the charge was dropped to voluntary manslaughter. (R. 42)
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For some period of time before the entry of the
plea, negotiations were occurring as to whether or not
the charge against appellant would be reduced. (R. 50,
59) .Mr. Mattson, one of appellant's court appointed
attorneys, testified that voluntary manslaughter never
entered into the negotiations. (R. 61, 63) However, Mr.
:Mattson also testified that he and l\ir. Vernieu, the
other court appointed attorney, had some difficulty in
communicationg with l\fr. Hathaway, enough difficulty
so that tne attorneys felt Mr. Hathaway's behavior
was eccentric, and Mr. Hathaway's behavior was one
factor involved in the attorneys' decision to have Mr.
Hathaway undergo a psychiatric evaluation. (R. 61,
62) Mr. :Mattson also testified that Mr. Vernieu could
have had conversations with Mr. Hathaway when he
(Mr. Mattson) was not present. (R. 63)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELO\;V ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S PETITION l''OR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS IN THAT APPELLANT
DID NOT ENTER HIS PLEA OF GUILTY
KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY BECAUSE HE WAS NOT AWARE OF \VHICH
CIIARGE HE '1V AS ENTERING HIS PLEA
OF GUILTY TO.
This court has held that a plea of guilty
must be made voluntarily, without undue in-
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fluence or coercion, and with a clear under.,
standing of what the charge is ... (Emphasis
added.) Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah2d 294,
452 P.2d 323 (1969).
It is appellant's contention that "'hen he pleaded guilty
in 1965 to the crime of murder in the second degree he
did not know what he was pleading guilty to and therefore his plea of guilty must be withdrawn because it
was not knowingly and intelligently entered with a clear
understanding of the charge and penalty.

Numerous courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have dealt 'With the problem .of whether
or not a guilty plea was entered intelligently and knowingly. In BradJJ v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct.
1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 737 (1970), fn. 6, the Court said:
The importance of assuring that a defendant
does not plead guilty except with a full understanding of the charges against him and the
possible consequences of his plea was at the
heart of our recent decision in ... Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23
L.Ed,2d274 (1969).
Appellant does not contend that the requirement of
Boykin that the record show that a defendant was advised of the rights he waives when he pleads guilty applies to his case, but conternls that, as the Court said in

Brady

t'.

United States, supra, fn. 4, 25 L.Ed.2d at 756:
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The requirement that a plea of guilty must be
intelligent and voluntary to be valid has long
been recognized. See nn. 5 and 6, infra . ... The
new element added in Boykin was the requirement that the record must affirmatiYely disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty
entered his plea understandingly and volutarily ....
The law as it existed at the time of appellant's guilty
plea was well stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in
State t'. JJTilliams, 361 S.\V.2d 72 (Mo.' 1962). There
the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea to a rape
charge. The trial court had asked the defendant's attorney if he had explained the penalties to the defendant
and the attorney responded that he had. However, the
trial court did not ask the defendant anything. On appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea
the court reversed the lower court and ordered a new
plea be entered and said:
It [a guilty plea] should never be received unless it is freely and voluntarily made. If the
defendant should be misled or be induced to
plead guilty by fraud or mistake, any misapprehension, fear, persuasion, or the
out of hopes which prove to be false or ill
founded, he should be permitted to withdraw
his plea. The law favors a trial on its merits.
(citing cases) 361 S.\V.2d at 775.
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A leading case is United Statc.Y ex. rel. Crosby t'.
Brierley, 404 F .2d 90 (3rd Cir. 1968) . In that case, an
appeal from a denial of habeas corpus relief, the defendant had pleaded "guilty generally" to murder.
Under Pennsylvania law a hearing was then held to
determine the degree of the offense. The court there
stated the general rule that if a guilty plea is not voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the consequences the requirements of due process are not met.
The record of the plea was quite barren, but the defendant testified at the habeas corpus hearing that he
did not know the consequences of his plea nor the nature
of the offense he was pleading to. Under a state rule
(which was simply a restatement of the general common
law rule prevailing) the court was not to accept a guilty
plea unless it was competently and intelligently made.
The court said that it was a factual question whether
or not the guilty plea was knowingly and
entered. The court said that in the absence of a record
of the arraignment the burden shifts to the commonwealth to prove the issue of whether or not the plea
was knowing and intelligent. The court looked at the
"totality of the circumstances," including the defendant's age, background, his testimony, and so on.
and determined that the plea was not entered with a full
understanding of the consequences and allowed the plea
to be withdrawn.
Appellant contends that his guilty plea was not
entered knowingly and intelligently. He testified that
he thought he was pleading guilty to voluntary man-
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slaughter, and that he was not sure what his sentence
was. There was further testimony that appellant and
his attorneys had a problem in communication and that
appellant's behavior was eccentric. These circumstances
show satisfactorily that appellant did not understand
fully the charge he was pleading guilty to nor the
sentence under such charge. It is crucial that appellant
understand what he is charged with and what the possible sentence is. As this court stated in Strong v. Turner, supra, a guilty plea must be entered with "clear understanding of what the charge is . . . . " (Emphasis
added) Further, as the court in Berry v. United States.
412 F.2d 189 (3rd Cir. 1969) said:
Except for capital punishment, no other consequence can be as significant to an accused as
the period of possible confinement when one
enters a plea of guilty.
See also Nealy v. Cupp, 2 Ore. App. 240, 467 P.2d 649
( 1970), where the court held that information given to
a defendant regarding the maximum sentence must be
accurte. If a defendant is not fully informed, the defendant cannot be said to understand the true legal consequences of his guilty plea.
Appellant contends that he has adequately shown
that he did not make his guilty plea knowingly and intelligently. While it is true that under decisions of this
court the evidence the plaintiff in a habeas corpus
proceeding presents need not be taken as fact (see
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Strong 'l'. Turner, supra), appellant submits that he has
met his burden. This court in JJI cGuff ee v. Turner, 18
Utah2d 359, 423 P.2d 166 (1967), said that in a habeas
corpus proceeding the plaintiff has the burden to prove
his allegations by "clear and convincing" evidence. However, this court later in Farrell v. Turner, 25 Utah2d
351, 482 P .2d 117 ( 1971), said that the plaintiff "had
the burden of convincing the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence" that she was unlawfully incarcerated. Therefore appellant submits that even though
this court has held that his testimony need not be taken
as fact, as the court in United States ex. rel. Crosby v.
Brierley, supra, said, appellant's testimony should be
considered as much a part of his guilty plea as his uttering of the word "guilty." That is, if a court can believe
appellant when he says he is guilty, it is difficult to
understand why he cannot be believed when he says he
did not know what the charge was he was pleading
guilty to and he did not know the corresponding sentence. As such, appellant contends that based upon the
totality of the circumstances, including appellant's testimony, appellant has met his burden and shown that his
guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered.
As a result, appellant's guilty plea should be set aside
and he should be entitled to plead anew.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that appellant's guilty
plea was not knmvingly and intelligently entered, ap··
pellant respectfully submits that the judgment below
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be reversed and that appellant be released from respondent's custody and be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea and enter a new plea.
Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE C. LUBECK

.Att-0rney far .A ppeUant

